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The decision-making processes of historical famine-induced migration move-
ments have rarely been examined in detail. This article discusses such a move-
ment from the Greek island of Chios and into Turkey in the early 1940s using
first-hand accounts of famine survivors collected in the period 1999–2009. This
article outlines the unfolding famine situation, describes the point at which
individuals made the decision to leave or to stay and examines how that deci-
sion was implemented. The decision-making involved an elaborate process
where pros and cons were assessed, where the wishes of individual family mem-
bers were taken into consideration and where the long-term wellbeing of the
family unit was the most important factor in any decision made. Difficult de-
cisions, some of which may today appear irrational, were made. The article
argues that individuals, even in crises situations, demonstrate agency and plan
their actions and future, albeit within the constraints of a given situation.
Among the most pervasive historical reasons for the creation of migratory
flows and refugees are famines and food crises (Hugo 1984: 23). When
coupled with war and occupation, the effects are even more potent.
Famines and food crises have continued to be some of the most significant
reasons for migration even at the beginning of the twenty-first century
(Walker 1990; Akokpari 1998: 214). While famine literature readily and in-
variably acknowledges the cause-and-effect link between famine and popula-
tion movement, as well as the effects of such migration, there is little focused
research exploring the decision-making processes involved, especially in his-
torical populations (Hugo 1984: 22; Maharatna 2014: 280; though see O´
Gra´da 2009: 81–89). The obvious exception is the Irish famine of the mid-
nineteenth century (for an overview of the numerous publications on the Irish
famine, see Fitzgerald and Lambkin (2008)), although, even in that case, little
effort has been made to move from the specifics of that famine to wider links
between famines and migration. Much of the famine literature refers to the
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‘wandering’ of individuals and how this leads to the earlier death of such
individuals, who also contribute to the spread of disease, thus further increas-
ing mortality (Maharatna 2014: 277). Other works refer to selective migra-
tion, where, for example, husbands desert their families, leaving behind the
most vulnerable to face heightened mortality or focus on rural-to-urban
population movements (Vaughan 1987; Loevinsohn 2015: 13). The temporary
nature of much famine migration is also emphasized (Hugo 1984: 22;
Watkins and Menken 1985: 652; Will 1990; Pitka¨nen 1992; Findley 1994; O´
Gra´da 1999: 104, citing Sen 1981: 98, 205). The Irish famine again constitutes
an exception: a significant feature of the migration associated with it was the
permanent emigration of both men and women to North America (O´ Gra´da
1999: 104–121). In some cases, temporary migrations assume permanency
(Hugo 1984: 25). While the extensive migration resulting from food crises
is readily acknowledged and explained as a survival strategy, questions relat-
ing to why it happens in some regions but not others, and in some groups or
households but not others, have not been thoroughly addressed (Arnold
1988: 92; Maharatna 2014: 282–284, discussing Hugo 1984: 27).
Why only a few works have moved beyond description of the observed
patterns is easily explained by the absence of relevant sources that would
allow us to understand the decision-making processes of individuals and
families. In historical crises, it is rare to come across famished individuals
who kept detailed diaries, especially when in transit. However, studies focus-
ing on more recent events can use interviews to elicit explanations and under-
stand the thinking and experiences of refugees. Such studies have revealed
that the decision to migrate was not taken lightly, but rather was a ‘measure
of last resort’ and was arrived at only after all possible efforts had been made
to cope with the local situation (Afifi et al. 2012; Kolmannskog 2012; Xun
2013). Thus, important questions relating to famine migration that need to be
addressed are: At what point do famine-affected individuals decide to migrate
and/or become refugees? What are the decision-making processes for individ-
uals and households? How are decisions made regarding who will leave and
who will stay? Unsurprisingly, it is much more difficult to address the above
questions for historical populations than for contemporary ones.1
This article examines one such case of famine migration: that of the Greek
island of Chios in 1941–44, where there was an acute crisis in the form of a
famine. This case has particular significance because this same population
had already lived through the very traumatic events of 1922, when thousands
of refugees arrived on the island from Turkey (Hirschon 2003). Of these 1922
refugees, 13,000 remained on Chios and rebuilt their lives from scratch there
(Vios 1937: 56, utilizing the 1928 census data). In studying the early 1940s
famine migration, it is the use of oral histories that provides us with an
understanding of the how, why and when individuals and families decided
to leave the island and become de facto refugees.2 The significance of the
research presented here lies in the fact that the famine survivors interviewed
by the author discussed their thinking at the time and explained the process
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of making the decision to migrate or not half a century after the events—
something that provided them with a degree of emotional distance.
In the remainder of this article, I will present the unfolding famine situ-
ation and examine when individuals made the decision to leave or not and
how they implemented that decision. It will be argued that the decision-
making process was elaborate, including an assessment of pros and cons
and a consideration of the wishes of individual family members. However,
the long-term wellbeing of the family unit was the most important factor in
any decision. Difficult decisions, some of which may appear irrational to an
objective observer, were made. The article argues that individuals, even in
crises, demonstrate agency and plan their actions and future, albeit within the
constraints of the situation.
Sources
The main sources employed here are 20 oral histories collected in 1999 by the
author with the objective of gathering qualitative sources relating to the so-
called ‘winter of 1941–42’ famine (see Margarites 1993; Mazower 2001;
Hionidou 2006). The informants were Chians who experienced the famine
and were at least 15 years old in 1941, the year the famine started.
Fourteen interviews with individual informants took place (five men and
nine women) while six interviews were with couples.3 Informants were
traced through local connections developed during the two months prior to
the interviews, which were spent collecting archival sources. Snowballing was
used to identify informants; nevertheless, this brought together individuals
from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, with diverse experiences
and outcomes.
What the quantitative sources and, to a similar degree, the oral histories
revealed was that the famine was not confined to 1941–42; rather, a serious
food crisis was prevalent on the island throughout the occupation years 1941–
4, thus contradicting both the existing historiography and the national col-
lective memory (Hionidou 2013: 289–322). Without prompting, all the in-
formants discussed the escape of Chians from the island and their seeking
refuge in Asia Minor. Eighteen informants spoke about the movement off the
island. Of the informants, half had either left the island themselves or had
experienced the departure of a close relative. The fact that so many of the
islanders had travelled to Asia Minor owing to the famine was evidently part
of the collective local memory—at least among the elderly locals at the time.
However, it was virtually unknown to the wider public outside the island
until 2015, when Syrian and other refugees started arriving on the Greek
islands—something that prompted the ‘remembering’ and wide discussion
of this past (Mpratsos 2016).
When I asked the informants about the famine during the interviews in
1999, I was initially unaware of the movement of civilians to Asia Minor and
did not bring the issue into the discussion; it was invariably the interviewees
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who raised it, and they did so on their own terms. Furthermore, I did not
actively encourage the informants to talk about their refugee experience.
Thus, any references to the refugees originated from the informants and
demonstrates their interest and investment in the topic. If anything, my pres-
ence as interviewer affected the interview in the sense that, although I did not
ask the informants to talk about this experience, the very fact of my presence
encouraged the informants to mention it (on inter-subjectivity, see Portelli
1991, 1997; Abrams 2010: 54–77).
There is a growing literature on the subjectivity of personal testimonies and
oral histories and how this should be considered in the interpretation of
collected material. Here it is imperative to emphasize the timing of these
interviews. They took place in late 1999, when the years of occupation and
especially the famine were rarely discussed in public, except in relation to the
resistance movement. In 1999, the collective national memory of the famine
had been clearly defined as representing mainly, if not exclusively, the
Athenian experience, as was articulated in the late 1940s by a number of
authors (Hionidou 2013, 2019). As mentioned earlier, local collective mem-
ories had been formed on Chios and elsewhere but these were rarely dis-
cussed, at least in public.4 In order, however, to avoid the extensive
reproduction of collective memories, the informants were all selected for
their first-hand experience of the famine and I consciously navigated the
interviews towards the informants’ personal experiences. Whenever generic
comments were made, I would make an effort to ascertain whether these
reflected personal experiences or not. So, for example, one of the informants
who left the island very early on and, as he confessed, had not in fact
experienced the famine on Chios nonetheless made statements about the
famine and its causes, essentially reproducing the then dominant national
collective memory while contradicting what most of the other informants
had said. These sources are thus important because they provide us with
the thinking of these people, their reasoning for having done what they did
and their experiences in transit and at the reception places. A potential issue
is that these informants are exclusively survivors: survivors of the famine and
survivors among those who became refugees. We have no first-hand infor-
mation from those who died either on the island or having left it.
In addition to the oral histories collected by the author, at later dates,
other scholars (Makridakis in 2001–06 and Priovolos (I assume) between
2006 and 2009) also interviewed famine survivors on Chios and subsequently
published extracts of those testimonies (Makridakis 2006; Priovolos 2009).
Along with these interviews, survivors’ diaries and a handful of publications
referring to the island have also been used here. It is these that inform us that
a total of 18,000 people left the island, of whom 3,500–4,000 came from the
town of Chios, the capital of the island (the town population in 1940 was
26,617) (Argenti 1966: 225–245). Ioannes Petrakes estimated in 1945 that
there were around 15,000 Chian refugees (Argenti 1966: 53). Some of the
informants suggested that a third of the population left (No. 21), others
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that half did (No. 17), while still others put the figure at 25,000 (i.e. 33 per
cent, No. 20). Therefore, while we do not have an accurate figure of the
extent of the exodus, we know that it was significant, involving anything
between 20 and 50 per cent of the island population, which in 1940 was
75,833.
The Famine: Greece and Chios
From October 1940, Greece fought against the invading forces of Italy. In
April 1941, Germany also invaded and the war ended before the end of the
month. The occupied country was divided among Germany, Italy and
Bulgaria, each occupying different regions (Mazower 2001: 21). Chios, and
its neighbouring island of Lesbos, were occupied by Germans. The limited
availability of food was evident as soon as Greece was occupied but famine—
in the form of significantly increased mortality—prevailed in the towns of
Chios and Vrontados from October 1941 to January 1943. During this
period, mortality increased 4.6 times in relation to the non-crisis period of
1938–39 (Hionidou 2006: 159–162). While this rate represents the situation in
the two towns, the rest of the island also suffered from famine, although it is
difficult to quantify its effects. Food scarcity and insecurity continued until
the end of the occupation in the summer of 1944. The reasons for this are
complex, but include Greece’s historical dependence on food imports; once
occupied, a blockade was imposed by the Allies, preventing any imports from
taking place; concealment of foodstuffs by the population, who were appre-
hensive about the prospects of obtaining food in the future; and the impos-
ition of draconian restrictions on the movement of food and population
within both Greece as a whole and smaller administrative units. Such restric-
tions—along with the fear of the bombing of boats and mines—meant that
communications between different islands, or between islands and the main-
land, were severely curtailed. This was especially the case until late 1942,
when some of the restrictions on internal population movement were some-
what relaxed. Moreover, communications within the island were also made
difficult because of the confiscation of bicycles, cars and boats by the
German army. Petrol was provided by the German authorities only when
they believed it was necessary—for example, for fishing on Chios. This was
not necessarily the case elsewhere. For example, on Italian-occupied islands,
fishing was much more restricted (Hionidou 2006).
Geography had a major role to play not only in the intensity of the famine
within Chios (and Greece), but also in the creation of the refugee movement
to Turkey. In essence, towns were probably more affected by the famine, but
rural areas also suffered. For Chios, its geographic position and proximity to
Turkey—the distance between Chios and the Turkish coast being less than
four miles at some points—provided a rare avenue to escape occupation,
starvation and persecution. While other islands, such as Lesbos and Samos,
were also close to the Turkish coast, their experience of moving across was
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somewhat different since Lesbos experienced a harsher German occupation
than Chios whereas Samos was occupied by Italy in the early years of occu-
pation. The focus of this article will remain on Chios.
Why Leave? Why Not Leave?
After Germany invaded in early April 1941, Greece surrendered and those
soldiers who were not taken as prisoners were left to find their way from the
Greek–Albanian border to their homes. The German army entered Athens on
21 April, but Chios was not occupied until 5 May 1941. This delay and the
chaotic early days of the occupation provided an essential window of oppor-
tunity for young men to escape to the Middle East via Turkey. The fact that
a Greek army was assembled in the Middle East was widely known and thus
it appears likely that the first wave of migrants comprised young men who
sought to fight for their country and avoid the widely feared fate of being
conscripted by the German army. Most men who left for this reason did so in
the early months of the occupation. Those who left later tended to do so as
part of a family group, although all able-bodied men who reached Turkey
were immediately conscripted to the Greek Middle Eastern Army. The few
who left on their own in 1942 and therefore not a part of the early wave,
although still evoking patriotism, were also eager to leave hunger and famine
behind (No. 8; Priovolos 2009: 236). Those who found themselves ‘noticed’
by the Germans on the island, such as those who were arrested as black-
marketeers, also escaped as soon as they had the opportunity to do so
(Priovolos 2009: 270).
By the autumn of 1941, families had also started to leave because of the
food situation (Calvocoreses 1958: 251–254). Those who left early in this
period were those particularly well placed in terms of preparing for and
making such a journey:
My brother, my husband, they would go to the villages [to get food] so we
managed to get by. When we did not, we got in an old caique and went to
C¸esme [Turkish town across from Chios]. From there we went to Cyprus . . .
[my family] were working in the [Chios] port and they knew the whereabouts,
where to leave from. We did not see a German [soldier]; we did not see a guard
or a Turk. We got in the boat as if we were going to our homes and so we
arrived at C¸esme; the same day they put us in a boat and we sailed to Cyprus
because we had soldiers [men who would be conscripted and therefore they were
prioritized] (No. 5, female, born in 1909).
The informant quoted above and her husband originated from Asia Minor,
and they and their parental families had come to Chios in the early 1920s as
refugees. They therefore had an excellent knowledge of their destination and,
it can only be assumed, of the language too. Because her husband was a
boatman, they obtained a licence from the German authorities for the boat
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and therefore the journey did not cost them anything. Leaving the island so
early meant that the informant did not actually experience the worst of the
famine, though she did experience the food scarcity that was visible in the
summer of 1941. Crossing the Aegean resolved the food issue instantly: ‘We
left for the bread and we found the bread’ (No. 5).5 In the early months of
1942, others who had urgent reasons to leave did so:
My father got a cold and became very ill . . . his lungs. There were no medicines
. . .. Can a man get better with herbal drinks? And so, we were forced to leave
because our boys [her two brothers, who had left five to six months earlier] had
told us ‘don’t let him die. If you see that [he gets worse] leave the house, don’t
consider anything, leave’; and we left. Maybe we should not have left; anyway,
we left (No. 22, Female).
Leaving during the winter months was rarely attempted, as the crossing was
dangerous, but, in this case, the imperative of the father’s health determined
their departure. Subsequent departures seem to have taken place exclusively
during the spring and autumn, when the weather was most appropriate for
such a journey.
In 1942 and 1943, there was an exodus of people from the island entirely
because of the famine and the extreme insecurity of the food situation.
Between March and mid-May 1942, 8,000–9,000 people arrived in Turkey
from Chios (ICRCA, Box 9, 18 May 1942). Informant No. 17 left in April
1942, soon after Easter, after he and his family had experienced the worst of
the famine but without deaths within the family unit. His wife-to-be, whom
he met while in the refugee camp, was less fortunate:
Q: Whom did you leave with?
A: I left with my father. My mother had died . . . during the occupation. And
my father said ‘If we are to stay here, we will all die my daughter’ . . .. My
father came back from the warfront . . . and he used to go around to villages
and they had some things [to eat] . . . but then he saw that it wasn’t possible
anymore and he said ‘my daughter, we will leave to go to C¸esme’ (No. 17 (wife
of main informant); similar comment from Makridakis’ informants (2006: 39)).6
That the famine, rather than another factor, was the main reason for leaving
was emphasized by some of the informants:
Q: When the Germans arrived, when the hunger started, people left from the
town . . ..
A: Yes, of course.
Q: To go to the villages?
A: No, they went to Asia Minor, to Turkey.
Q: May I ask why?
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A: There, there was food. So, I remember, the [local] bishop said [in a sermon]
then, that there are two roads, one leads to the cemetery, the other to the East
[Asia Minor]. The Germans tried to prosecute him for that . . ..
Q: Who left? The most poor? Or was it . . ..
A; The poorest. Yes, they left, and not because they felt persecuted by the
Germans (No. 21).
A Red Cross representative at C¸esme reported of ‘the fear of dying’ that
dominated the actions of the refugees (ICRCA, Box 23, 2 May 1942). Still,
leaving was not a feasible solution for all, since the dangerous and illegal trip
across was extremely expensive throughout the years of occupation:
Q: Many people left. But many poor stayed here and died. What was the
difference between the two? Why those poor who stayed here . . ..
A: They could not leave, they did not have the means, they could not leave.
Because in order to leave for the Middle East, it was not free. You had either to
have golden sovereigns or to give something [valuable] to leave. They [boatmen]
were taking all they [the passengers] had . . .. It was not easy. You may have
been able to find means to leave but it was not easy. It was not free! (No. 14,
Male, born in 1914).
The large expense that was involved in making the journey was noted by all
the informants (Nos 2, 10, 18, 21, 22; Makridakis 2006: 40, 52, 161), although
they showed no discernible emotion when discussing it. The cost deterred
some from contemplating the journey, but others resorted to blackmail: the
mother of an informant who decided to leave with her seven young children
offered the boatman whatever she could afford and demanded to be taken
across; otherwise, she told him, she would inform the police of his illicit
activities—something that convinced him not only to take them across, but
also to make sure that the children were adequately fed for a number of days
while they were waiting in hiding on the island for the wind to blow in the
right direction (No. 7, wife of informant; see also Makridakis 2006: 31).
Aside from considerations of cost, some Chians decided not to seek refuge
in Turkey because of events associated with the 1922 Asia Minor Catastrophe
and the effects that they had on individuals and families (Hirschon 1998).
One informant explained how her mother took the decision to leave with her
young children, including the informant, but her grandmother decided not to
go because
she did not want. Because she was a [1922] refugee and they [Turks] had killed
her son and her husband and she was scared of the Turks. ‘I would rather stay
here and die rather than go there to see again [the place where it happened]’
(No. 7, female informant).
Similarly, informant No. 20, who was himself a refugee in 1922, responded in
an exasperated manner to my asking why he did not leave: ‘But daughter, we
experienced two persecutions. In 1914 they kicked us out of there . . . and in
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1922 again.’ When his sister and her husband considered the option of leav-
ing because of the food situation and raised it with him, he dissuaded them
by saying that ‘we were twice refugees. In 1914 and in 1922. Again? Where
will we go? Have you not had enough of being refugees?’ (No. 20, born in
1911). Thus, the previous experiences of the 1922 refugees had a significant
impact, while, clearly, this was not the case for the Chians who had not
themselves been refugees in 1922. Despite this, it seems that the majority of
the 1922 refugees did in fact leave, as, according to informant No. 6, who
resided in a neighbourhood of 1922 refugees, ‘here in the neighbourhood, all
left’.
Informant No. 6 and her husband (a childless couple, both 1922 refugees)
decided against becoming refugees, despite the encouragement of her elderly
mother for them to leave. As her mother was blind, it was understood by all
that she could not make the journey. Leaving her behind on her own would
have been a death sentence and therefore the couple decided against it.
Moreover, the couple were earning a good living at the time on Chios.
Similarly, others took the same decision in order to support mothers and
grandmothers who could not make the journey and for whom a decision
to leave would have a very clear outcome: that of death. Informant No. 3
had observed this happening to his elderly neighbours who were left behind
by their children early on in 1941, and thus his and his wife’s decision was to
stay:
Q: How come you did not leave? . . ..
A: I had . . . my wife had her mother, she had her grandmother and our houses
were adjacent. And I was telling my wife for us to go to the Middle East too.
She said ‘Where [how] am I to leave my grandma, where can I leave my
mother?’ . . .. That’s it. That’s why we stayed . . .. She [the wife] was saying to
me ‘how can I leave? They fed me [brought me up], they did everything for me.’
She did not have a father, you see (No. 3. A similar situation is described by
Priovolos (2009: 358), though here the elderly relative was a great aunt).
A further reason why families or parts of families chose to stay on Chios was
concerns over leaving their wealth, moveable and immoveable, unprotected.
That this was a major concern is clear in most interviews, whether with rural
residents or urbanites. In all cases, those who left appointed guardians of the
wealth left behind. When the guardians were not family members, invariably
the return to the island brought disappointment to those who had left:
We came back to our house and we found it . . . there was nothing left. We did
not have time to sell anything [before we left the island]. We got a woman we
knew, to stay in the house but she destroyed it. They sold everything. They sold
everything and that is not excusable because we had underneath [on the ground
floor] a coffee shop and they run that and they played [gambled] at night and
they earned golden sovereigns and amassed money from this shop. And despite
that, they sold everything (No. 22).
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Even in situations where the wealth left behind was modest, similar concerns
and sentiments were expressed:
I, ok, in my case, well they [cousins] did not steal from me. . . . Then I used to
sell, I sold small items, reels, socks, various things [as huckster]. Even though I
was a child, I used to go around, before the war. In 1941 with the war, I used to
go around and sell such things . . . and I had two chests full of things.
Everything. And the old woman [his stepmother] says ‘give them to your
aunt whose husband is away in the sea and they might give us something [in
return] when we come back’. And the end was that we came back and . . .
of course my cousins survived. Well, never mind, [let’s forget it], never mind
(No. 17).
While this informant is not directly articulating any grievances against his
aunt and cousins regarding the goods he left behind, the way he expresses
himself indicates that the cousins’ survival was linked to the goods but that,
presumably, there was nothing in return for him when he returned to the
island. And, although he clearly mentions the house that he left behind, he
quickly adds that ‘the house was old’ and therefore there was little that could
have happened to it. Thus, those leaving had serious concerns about the
wealth they left behind, and indicated to me that they understood at the
time that looting was the expected outcome if trusted guardians—preferably
first-degree relatives—were not appointed. Some did not find such a trusted
guardian and so, despite deciding ‘2–3 times to leave’, they did not do so
(No. 15). Their fear that their assets would be looted or destroyed was a
reasonable one. For example, during the first month of occupation and
before the German army reached Athens, looting was taking place both by
and of Greeks (Hionidou 2019). On Syros, during an extremely cold winter in
the course of the famine, empty houses were broken into and their wooden
floors were pulled out and used or sold, as no petrol or wood was available
on the island. Similarly, house walls were dismantled in order to obtain the
wood that had been used in their construction. Thus, whole houses were
effectively destroyed for a minimal return (Nos 3, 4, 1, all from Syros).
As intimated above, the journey across the Aegean was precarious. That it
posed significant dangers was known and understood by all: for example,
most informants showed a clear understanding of the dangers such a journey
involved for the boat-owners. Although the boatmen were able and experi-
enced, with a good knowledge of the Turkish coast, the boats were invariably
small, broken (and only temporarily fixed for the journey) and overloaded, as
all the decent boats had been confiscated and either destroyed or were
guarded by German soldiers. Though the distance was very short, boats re-
mained stranded for days on end until the wind was right for sailing. The
journey was made all the more dangerous because such movement out of the
island was illegal; the relevant decree by the German authorities, reissued
on many occasions, specified execution for those who tried to escape
(ANON. 1941; Calvocoreses 1958: 247 Decree of 5 May 1941). This was
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not widely implemented, although some boatmen who were arrested were
executed (Makridakis 2006: 26–30, 32). Journeys invariably took place
during the night and some Chians drowned (Karouses 1985: 89–91;
Proodos reported the drowning of 300 women and children (ANON. 1942);
Makridakis 2006: 30; Nos 15, 17, 19, 20, 21; Priovolos 2009: 376). The jour-
ney was in many ways one into the unknown: people on Chios were not able
to communicate with relatives and friends who had left in order to find out
the situation in Turkey and thus were unable to judge whether leaving the
island was worthwhile. Their decision depended almost entirely on the gravity
of the situation in the place of origin. However, the journey was one that
most—at least among those older than 30 years of age—had done in the past.
Until 1912, Chios was part of the Ottoman empire and its close geographical
proximity to as well as its close trade links with the empire’s mainland meant
that many Chians had travelled across to work as seasonal workers, servants
or boatmen, or just to visit friends and relatives, and therefore were familiar
with the coastline, the language and the people (Tsiropina 1999: 77;
Makridakis 2006: 32, 29, 32, 59, referring to seasonal migration; Nos 3, 10,
17, 20; Priovolos 2009: 280, referring to local women working as servants in
Turkey before and after 1922; informant No. 22’s parental family owned
property both in Asia Minor and on Chios prior to 1922).7 All the first-
hand accounts of Chian famine refugees refer to at least one refugee
among the group travelling who had knowledge of Turkish and could com-
municate with the people or soldiers encountered. In many cases, the Turks
encountered by the refugees after their sea journey were able to speak Greek.
Thus, the decision-making was complex and evolved over time, with per-
sonal assets having been depleted or sold usually by the end of 1941 and
certainly by March 1942, and with only irregular food assistance coming
from abroad through the Red Cross and via Turkey (Hionidou 2006).
Assistance never became regular as it did in Athens from September 1942
onwards, thus maintaining food insecurity throughout 1943 and beyond.
That this insecurity was perceived to be long-term is demonstrated by the
fact that, when the first consignment of flour arrived on the island in June
1942 and was distributed by the ICRC, a significant part of the population
chose to use much of their portion as payment for the journey across to
Turkey (Calvocoreses 1958: 255; No. 14).
Decision-making in a Famine Situation
What is rather unexpected in the case of Chios—in relation both to World
War II literature and to that of famine and, in more recent decades, of
climate migration—is the extent to which families left. The literature predom-
inantly identifies individuals, mostly males, as migrants and only rarely do
families appear to migrate (Warner et al. 2012: 3–4, where, out of the eight
case studies, only in India was nuclear family migration reported; Vaughan
1987). While the Irish famine emigration was family-oriented, it excluded the
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very young and the very old (O´ Gra´da 1999: 108, 121). Among the Chian
refugees, families represented many more incidents of migration than did
solitary men. Those men who left on their own were mostly single and
migrated during the very early months of the occupation for reasons not
associated with the famine. Occasionally, married men also left on their
own because of the famine but, in such cases, a discussion took place
among household members and a decision was taken as result. For example,
when a young married man decided that he could no longer tolerate the food
situation, he asked his young wife to prepare a bundle for them to leave.
When her father realized, he intervened, arguing that this would not be an
appropriate journey for his daughter and posing the question: ‘what has she
done to you to take her with you?’ As the father was well-off, he was con-
fident that he could provide for his daughter on the island—something that
he would not necessarily do for his son-in-law. The husband’s response was
that it was her choice; she chose to stay, while her husband left (No. 8; a
similar situation was described by No. 7 (female informant, referring to her
parents)). Only rarely were those who left as a result of the famine not family
groups. However, when referring to family groups, further explanation is
required. These were not necessarily the pre-famine co-residing family
groups. Rather, families were reorganized in whatever way seemed best
suited to the situation and to the wishes of individuals to either leave or
stay. It should be emphasized that some reorganization of households
occurred soon after the occupation started, as this was perceived as, and
was, a time of crisis: for example, the recently married sister of informant
No. 16, whose sailing husband was absent, lived in her independent house-
hold along with a ‘young girl’, employed as a servant (or for company, as the
informant emphasized). When the occupation started and it was clear that the
husband would remain away while the war was ongoing, the young servant
was sent home and the recently married woman moved back to her parental
home (No. 16).
Significant and extraordinary rearrangements of residence occurred on a
large scale in preparation for leaving the island. So, for example, informant
No. 5 normally lived with her husband and young son in what used to be her
husband’s parents’ house in one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the town
of Chios. After the couple married in the late 1930s, her parents-in-law
resided on the ground floor of the house, while she and her family lived
on the first floor, although she emphasized that they ate together. At a
very early point of the occupation, her father-in-law died, presumably of
starvation. This was probably the trigger for her husband and his brother
to decide to leave the island with their families. However, as the informant
said:
we left my mother-in-law to her daughter . . . my sister-in-law came and stayed
[with her mother] . . . when we came back [after the end of the war], she left and
went to her house.
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While the informant was off the island, her sister-in-law lost her own son
to the famine.
In another case, the death of a family member seems, again, to have been
the trigger for the decision to depart. The female informant of interview No.
17, a resident of the town of Vrontado, left with her father and brother in
1942 following the death of her mother in 1941 from starvation. Having
heard rumours that life was easier in C¸esme, the father took the decision
to leave when he could no longer find food in the villages on the island. The
family of three departed on foot to reach the place where they expected to
find a boat. However, once there, the informant’s adolescent brother decided
to stay, and went to live with his uncle and grandmother in their village,
where he worked on the land and tended their animals (No. 17). Another
teenage man declined his mother’s suggestion to leave and declared that they
would cope on the island (Priovolos 2009: 324).
Farmers left as well as urbanites. Thus, a farmer who lived in Vrontado left
with two sons and a daughter, while his wife and their other three children
stayed behind. The eldest daughter decided to stay because her fiance´, to
whom she had recently become engaged, was also staying on the island
(No. 18). The arrangements made by rural residents were usually more com-
plicated because they had more tangible wealth to leave behind, in the form
of their land and growing crops. One informant described how, in the process
of negotiating to whom her father would leave his land and produce, she got
married to the person with whom her father was negotiating. Her father,
mother and two young siblings left the island, while she and her newly
acquired husband were instructed by her father:
[T]hat while we [the couple] remained in the village [we would] have/manage the
land, houses, everything. If we were to leave, [we should] pass on, my father’s
land to my sister who was married and lived in the town; all the land he had
given to me [as dowry], if I wanted, to give it [while away] to my sister or if my
husband wanted, to give it [temporarily] to his father (Zaharenia, female, born
in 1922, Priovolos 2009: 283).
Such decisions and movements of individuals from one household to another
(as also discussed above) presuppose that extensive discussions took place
before agreements were made and the group left. These discussions took
place among all the adults and included the young adolescents who wished
to decide their own destiny. Furthermore, on many occasions, they had to
involve individuals outside the co-resident group, as when a house or land
was left with relatives or neighbours (such arrangements were also referred to
by No. 3; and Makridakis 2006: 40).
The detail of the planning subsequent to the discussions and decisions was
impressive. Central was the unwavering expectation that these refugees-to-be
would be returning at some point in time, hence the elaborate arrangements
made to protect the property that was left behind, including land, houses and
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the goods these contained. In return for taking care of their assets, those who
stayed behind were compensated by the ration cards of the urban refugees-to-
be and the crops and land of the rural refugees-to-be, which could be utilized
by the land’s temporary custodians (No. 14). Nevertheless, the very nature of
the crisis meant that it was not always easy to look after other people’s assets:
[Those who stayed behind] were breaking into the houses, would take the fur-
niture and would sell them in the villages; and they would take the china, took
[everything]. Because Vrontados [was inhabited by] sailors and they had [goods]
that they had brought from earlier times [from abroad] (No. 17).
Deciding to leave was not easy: the fact that only a handful of families left in
the second half of 1941, when famine mortality was increasing rapidly month
after month, is clear evidence of this. While young men did leave in signifi-
cant numbers in that first year, families only left following the famine peak in
mortality in March 1942, with 280 deaths in that month compared with
‘normal’ months of fewer than 50 deaths (Hionidou 2006: 160). Their reluc-
tance to leave was at least in part a result of apprehension about the situation
that awaited them in Turkey: ‘[People] were leaving to the unknown. No one
knew where they were going’ (No. 22; also Makridakis 2006: 31; No. 8).
Compounding this, in April 1942, boats full of refugees that had reached
the Turkish coast were forced to return to Chios, only to be sent away
again by the German authorities, who refused to allow them back to the
island (Argenti 1966: 55; Makridakis 2006: 32–38, 68–69). All informants
emphasized the complete lack of communication between the island and
the refugees who had already left throughout the occupation years. The
only possible communication was oral, and refugees might hear news of
their relatives on the island only when people from their villages arrived in
the Middle East as refugees themselves.
As noted above, leaving the island was an illegal action. But, while the
German army guarded some of the departure spots, their force on the island
was far too small to be able to guard them all. Very rarely, the German force
actually engaged with the issue of the illegal departure of the population
beyond ensuring the confiscation, destruction or guarding of the existing
boats soon after their arrival on the island. However, such actions, while
effective for the first year of their presence on the island, had little effect
in 1942 and thereafter, when famine was presenting a much more significant
threat to the lives of the islanders than were the German measures to prevent
escape. However, the German measures, combined with the illegality of the
move, did contribute to the extreme cost of the passage mentioned above.
Most passengers had to pay in kind or with gold—especially from 1942 on-
wards—while those who left in 1941 managed to cross by paying with—soon
to be worthless—currency (Makridakis 2006: 48, 161, 30; No. 14). The timing
of the departure was primarily determined by the weather but also by the
ability to pay for the passage. For example, many chose to leave when their
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crops were growing and it was thus clear what would be available to them—
essentially exchanging those in-the-ground crops for transport across the
Aegean. In another instance, the arrival of relief in the form of a significant
load of flour distributed to the islanders was used by many to gain passage
across the sea. This calculated and ingenious move ultimately saved the lives
of the poorest sections of the population, those who otherwise would not
have been able to seek refuge across the Aegean, in the summer of 1942.
Discussion and Conclusions
The population of Chios were aware that there was a food deficiency on the
island by the summer of 1941—a serious food crisis by September 1941 and a
deadly famine by October of the same year. Only a handful of inhabitants left
as a result of the crisis before March 1942, following six months of deadly
famine. During that winter, individuals did all they could to survive: they ate
unusual foods, engaged in unusual transactions, bought and sold goods at
very high prices, exchanged goods rather than buying and selling for cash,
begged, took on unfamiliar work and cultivated even the ‘uncultivatable’
land. In short, they did all they could to get by. Only after that, having
disposed of much of their moveable and some of their immoveable wealth
and observed hundreds of deaths of fellow islanders, did some decide to
illegally cross the sea to Asia Minor/Turkey and become refugees. They did
so when the weather was appropriate, in the knowledge that many young
men had escaped in earlier months and no dead bodies had consequently
been found in the sea, and having a familiarity with and an intimate know-
ledge of—at least in the cases of those aged 40 and over—the landscape,
culture and language of the people across the sea. They continued to leave
in subsequent months and years because the situation on the island continued
to be insecure in terms of food provisioning and despite the arrival of food-
stuffs via the International Red Cross from time to time. Extensive discus-
sions took place among family and household members regarding the
decision to migrate and who would leave, with individual wishes being re-
spected, even those of teenagers—a rather unusual occurrence in normal
times. The discussions also settled who would be left behind to look after
the house, land, assets and crops. The pre-1940 composition of households
does not seem to have had a discernible effect in this regard, as relatives from
other households were deployed when necessary. This latter decision was
linked to the understanding that refugees would ultimately return when con-
ditions permitted. Indeed, they all did, bar the few young women who got
married in Cyprus and remained there, the young men who were killed in
battle and those who drowned. Thus, those who left Chios did so only when
the food situation failed to become more secure; even though the food situ-
ation did improve markedly after the summer of 1942, by then, the popula-
tion was strikingly worse off than they had been a year earlier, having
disposed of much of their wealth. Thus, the decision to become refugees
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was one that was not even considered at the early stages, but was taken when
insecurity continued for an unusual length of time.8 The timing of the deci-
sion to migrate was dependent on the specifics of the early 1942 situation and
the sustained food insecurity, the illegality of the movement, but also it would
have been linked to the past experiences of this population in relation to
famines and food crises; thus, the food crisis/famine that resulted from the
blockade imposed by Britain and France in 1916 was one remembered and
mentioned by some of the oldest informants (Nos 8, 13). This experience
must have informed people’s thinking, understanding and assessment of the
situation in 1941–43, determining to a degree their responses to the ever-
changing situation (see Gatrell 2017: 170, putting forward the argument of
the benefit of working historically; also Engler et al. 2013: Figure 1). Equally
important would have been the population’s knowledge and familiarity of the
land, people, language and culture across the Aegean.
Migration was contemplated when there was neither improvement of the
situation nor a discernible prospect of such an improvement. While, for the
refugees, migration acted as a safety valve, it did so also for those who stayed
behind. This was clearly understood by all: those who left passed on their
growing crops, ration cards and other goods to relatives and friends, enabling
the finite food supply to feed those who were left behind (Priovolos 2009:
324; No. 17; No. 20). Thus, migration was a safety valve for all Chians, not
only those who left (O´ Gra´da and O’Rourke 1997: 4, 23). At the same time, it
formed a coping mechanism—one put in place after most others, only be-
cause, for the Chian population, this was the most ‘costly’ coping mechanism
of all (on coping mechanisms and adaptability, see Engler et al. (2013)).
Households, and the individuals within them, appraised the situation con-
tinually, shaping their actions, adapting and changing, exploring possibilities,
reacting to problems, discussing and making life-shaping decisions. Such acts
demonstrate agency, employed in conjunction with historical memories of
analogous events—related to both food crises and refugee status—and the
lessons learned from such events. These people could not be called either
famine ‘victims’ or impotent refugees (Gatrell 2017: 175).
Migration has been seen as the ‘most widespread and significant of con-
temporary adjustments to famine’ (Hugo 1984: 23, cited in Maharatna 2014:
290). I would argue that this was the case in the past too, as the Irish famine
and other cases demonstrate (Engler et al. 2013). Migration was in all prob-
ability extremely important in most historical famines: it is the difficulty in
observing, measuring and understanding such past movements that makes
them invisible. Nevertheless, migration, for most, indicated that an advanced
stage of a famine had been reached, not just the beginning of a food crisis.
Though, as O´ Gra´da has argued, it can be called a safety valve, it can neither
be equated with food relief nor be a substitute for it. Moreover, its timing
depends upon the specific population’s experience of past famines or food
crises: it is this experience that guides different populations to resort to mi-
gration at different stages of the famine. Overall, the migration movement
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out of Chios was meaningful, organized, well planned and rational for both
those who left and those who stayed. The decision was rooted in the indi-
vidual’s physical capabilities and cultural, historical and personal understand-
ing of the situation they encountered. As the externally controlled parameters
of the food situation changed along with their individual circumstances, they
appraised and reappraised their actions. Deciding to leave was only one of
the decisions they had to make and, although it may not have always looked
so to outsiders, the decision to leave was rational and rationalized by those
who made it in 1942 and 1943 Chios.
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1. It should be pointed out that not all famine migrants are refugees: temporary
migrations can be movements associated with the availability of jobs, while per-
manent emigration may be linked to employment in the receiving country.
Nevertheless, a significant fraction of famine migrations involve refugees or intern-
ally displaced persons.
2. I will refer to those who left the island during the occupation years as refugees.
This is the term the Chians, the local government and the central government used
to describe this group (ANON. 1944a, 1944b). Because, in 1922, large numbers of
refugees arrived, many remaining on the island, the term ‘refugee’ was part of the
islanders’ everyday language. This daily and widespread use of the term ‘refugee’
applies to the whole of post-1922 Greece, since a fifth of its population were 1922
refugees. The term became a ‘badge of honour’ in later years (Hirschon 1998), but
this was not the case in the 1940s. Nevertheless, as all islanders who left in the
early 1940s did so for fear of persecution or because their life was in danger—
because of the famine—they were indeed refugees, according to the UN definition.
For an interesting discussion of the label of ‘refugee’, see Zetter (1991: 39–62).
3. For further information on the informants, see Hionidou (2006: 29–31). For rea-
sons of anonymity, all interviews conducted by the author are noted with a
number.
4. The local collective memories of the famine on Syros and Chios are discussed in
Hionidou (2013).
5. See also a similar comment in relation to the Great Leap Forward famine (Xun
2013: 160).
6. Q: denotes the question posed by the interviewer.
7. Gatrell refers to the ‘path dependency’ of such refugee movements (Gatrell 2017:
183).
8. Similarly, in Ireland, migration was more common after Black ’47 rather than
during the worst of the famine (O´ Gra´da and O’Rourke 1997: 18).
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